Why is a 90% refining monopoly in heavy rare earths and gallium still throttling Western defense supply chains?
Subsidizing raw critical mineral extraction in North America and Australia has failed to break Beijing's stranglehold on defense and semiconductor supply chains. Because China controls 90% of chemical solvent separation and metal refining, Western manufacturers remain hostage to export licensing on heavy rare earths, gallium, and antimony.
Even during temporary diplomatic suspensions of outright bans, strict export licensing on gallium, germanium, antimony, and seven heavy rare earths—including dysprosium and terbium—acts as a permanent throttle on Western aerospace and chip fabs. A single F-35 fighter jet, Aegis radar array, or precision-guided munition relies on high-coercivity neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets doped with heavy rare earths that prevent thermal demagnetization above 180°C.
While miners like MP Materials and Lynas Rare Earths are racing to build domestic separation plants backed by Pentagon Title III funding, we see Western midstream refining facing a 150% to 200% operating cost penalty due to radioactive thorium waste regulations and reagent expenses. Worse, extraterritorial rules targeting foreign components with as little as 0.1% Chinese-refined rare earth content mean that without guaranteed government price floors, private capital will not finance unprofitable Western smelters.
Can Western defense and tech industries build a viable rare earth refining ecosystem without permanent state price floors and environmental permitting waivers?
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